EDGARDO V. QUESADA,
Petitioner, -versus- THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and CLEMENTE TERUEL, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 150325
Present: PUNO,
J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, * AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: August
31, 2006 |
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
|
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
|
|
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
|
|
|
|
For our
resolution is the Petition for Certiorari[1] (with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction) assailing
the Resolutions dated January 17, 2001 and September 17, 2001 issued by the Secretary
of Justice in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, entitled “Clemente M. Teruel, complainant, versus Ramon P. Camacho, Jr., Edgardo V. Quesada and Rodolfo Corgado, respondents.”
On March
1, 2000, Clemente M. Teruel, herein respondent, filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City, an affidavit-complaint[2] charging
Edgardo V. Quesada (herein petitioner), Ramon P. Camacho, Jr., and Rodolfo
Corgado with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, docketed as I.S. No. 00-29780-C. The affidavit-complaint alleges that on June
13, 1998 at Shangrila Plaza Hotel, EDSA, Mandaluyong City, Quesada, Camacho,
and Corgado represented themselves to Teruel as the president,
vice-president/treasurer, and managing director, respectively, of VSH Group Corporation;
that they offered to him a telecommunication device called Star Consultant Equipment
Package which provides the user easy access to the internet via television; that
they assured him that after he pays the purchase price of P65,000.00,
they will immediately deliver to him two units of the internet access device; that
relying on their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two
units; and that despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
It was only
petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit.[3] He alleged that he, Camacho, and Corgado are Star Consultant Trainers of F.O.M. Philippines,
Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of selling and marketing
telecommunication products and technologies; that they formed the VSH Group as
a corporation “for the principal purpose of pooling the commissions they will receive
as Star Consultant Trainers and then dividing said commissions among themselves
according to their agreement”; that while he admitted that the two units of
internet access devices purchased by herein respondent Teruel were not delivered
to him, however, this was not due to their alleged fraudulent representations since
they merely acted as sales agents of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.; and that they found
out too late that the said company could not cope with its commitment to them
as it ran short of supplies of telecommunication products.
On
Consequently,
an Information for estafa against petitioner Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
In the
meantime, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice a Petition for Review
challenging the
While
the RTC was hearing Criminal Case No. MC-00-2510, petitioner filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of
Justice, in dismissing his Petition for Review in I.S. No. 00-29780-C, acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the element of
fraud or deceit in the crime of estafa is not present[7]
and that there is no evidence which will prove that the accused’s promise to
deliver the purchased items was false or made in bad faith.[8]
The
Solicitor General, in his Comment, maintains that the Secretary of Justice, in
finding a probable cause against the three accused, did not act with grave
abuse of discretion and prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition for being
unmeritorious.
Initially,
we observe that the present petition was directly filed with this Court, in utter
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be filed with the Court of Appeals whose decision may
then be appealed to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[9] A direct recourse to this Court is warranted
only where there are special and compelling reasons specifically alleged in the
petition to justify such action. Such ladder of appeals is in accordance with
the rule on hierarchy of courts. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,[10]
we stressed that this should be the constant policy that must be observed strictly
by the courts and lawyers, thus:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a
court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the
task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for
some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This
is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts
and lawyers must strictly observe. (Underscoring supplied)
We later reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma[11] after
noting that there is “a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers
to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes
even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the
highest tribunal of the land.” We again
emphasized that:
x x x. This
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well
as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive. x x x. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional
Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x.
This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is, after all, a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative
of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket. x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
Here, we
cannot discern any special and compelling reason to justify the direct filing
with this Court of the present petition.
Clearly, it should be dismissed
outright.
Even assuming
that the petition can be filed directly with this Court, the same must
fail. Petitioner contends that the
element of fraud or deceit as an element of the crime of estafa is absent. Consequently, the affirmance by the Secretary
of Justice of the Investigating Prosecutor’s finding that there exists a
probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The
issue of whether the element of fraud or deceit is present is both a question of fact and a matter of defense, the determination of
which is better left to the trial court after the parties shall have adduced
their respective evidence. It bears
stressing that a preliminary investigation is merely an inquiry or proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.[12] It does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial
on the merits.[13] As implied by the words “probably guilty,” the inquiry is
concerned merely with probability, not absolute or moral certainty.[14] At this stage, the complainant need not
present proof beyond reasonable doubt.
A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties’ evidence.[15] A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and was committed by petitioner and his co-accused. As ruled by the Investigating Prosecutor and
affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, petitioner’s representation and assurance
to respondent Teruel that the telecommunication equipment would be delivered to
him upon payment of its purchase price was the compelling reason why he parted
with his money. Such assurance, the
Investigating Prosecutor added, is actually a misrepresentation or deceit.
Thus, we
hold that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse his discretion. An act of a court or tribunal may only be
considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.[16]
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Petition, id., p. 11.
[8]
[9] See Filadams
Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132422, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 460, 466-467; Ching v. Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 628-629, citing Nava v.
Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544; 367 SCRA 263 (2001); Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No.
164268,
[10] No. L-74766,
[11] G.R. No. 67787,
[12] Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, effective
[13] Ang v.
Lucero, G.R. No. 143169,
[14]
[15]
[16] Yee v.
Bernabe, G.R. No. 141393,